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DODD-FRANK'S REQUIREMENT OF "SKIN IN THE
GAME" FOR ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES MAY
SCALP CORPORATE LOAN LIQUIDITY
DAVID LINE BATTY
"The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely
defined, is that actions of people-and especially of goverpment-
always have effects that are unanticipated or unintended."
I. INTRODUcTION
The economic devastation of the past three years (and
counting) has come to be known as the Great Recession because it
has had far-reaching economic and societal effects not felt since
the Great Depression which inspired its name.2 Like its namesake,
the Great Recession started with a collapse in the financial
markets which quickly spread throughout the economy as a whole.
Not surprisingly, just as the Great Depression aroused widespread
calls for a comprehensive governmental response, the severity of
the current economic crisis made government action all but
inevitable. At first, the government's response consisted of
economic triage to prevent complete economic catastrophe. Only
after the economy had been stabilized did policy makers turn their
* Mr. Batty is an Assistant Professor at the Charlotte School of Law. Prior to joining
the faculty at the Charlotte School of Law, Mr. Batty was a Partner with Winston &
Strawn LLP where he represented financial institutions and corporations in secured
and unsecured syndicated loan transactions, as well as subordinated debt financings.
1. Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECON., http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html (last
visited Jan. 12, 2010).
2. See Paul Taylor et al., A Balance Sheet at 30 Months: How the Great Recession
Has Changed Life in America, PEw RES. CTR. (June 30, 2010), available at
http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/759-recession.pdf. The study states the
following: "[m]ore than half (55%) of all adults in the labor force say that since the
Great Recession began 30 months ago, they have suffered a spell of unemployment, a
cut in pay, a reduction in hours or have become involuntary part-time workers . . . ."
The survey also finds that the recession has led to a new frugality in Americans'
spending and borrowing habits; a diminished set of expectations about their
retirements and their children's future; and a concern that it will take several years, at
a minimum, for their family finances and house values to recover. Id.
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attention to long-term solutions intended to avoid a repeat of the
collapse. To date, the most comprehensive federal governmental
response is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) which became law on July 21, 2010.
Commensurate with its scope and breadth,3 the stated purpose of
the 2,300-plus page new law is "[t]o promote the financial stability
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the
American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes."4
Despite the sense of urgency which led to the passage of Dodd-
Frank, many of the law's provisions will not take effect for several
years. In fact, the full content of the law will not be known until
the various regulatory agencies created or otherwise empowered
with new responsibilities complete the rule-making process
mandated by Dodd-Frank. This rule-making process will last for
at least eighteen months following enactment of Dodd-Frank and
even longer if efforts to delay implementation of Dodd-Frank are
successful.
To assist the applicable regulatory agencies in preparing
implementing regulations, Dodd-Frank calls for over sixty
different reports to study the effects of the multitude of
regulations required pursuant to the comprehensive reform law.
In particular, Section 941(c) of Dodd-Frank requires the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) to conduct a
study on the effect of the risk retention requirements for Dodd-
Frank.! The FRB's Report to the Congress on Risk Retention
3. See FIN. REG. REFORM WORKING GRP. (WEIL, GOTSHAL, & MANGES LLP,
NEW YORK, NY), FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: AN OVERVIEW OF THE DODD-
FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 1 (2010), available
at http://www.weil.com/files/upload/Weil%20Dodd-Frank%200verview.pdf
[hereinafter WElL OVERVIEW] (noting that the legislation (i) includes 15 major parts
with 14 stand-alone statutes and numerous amendments to the current array of
banking, securities, derivatives, and consumer finance laws, (ii) is intended to
restructure significantly the regulatory framework for the United States financial
system and (iii) will have broad and deep implications for the financial services
industry as well as parts of the economy beyond the financial sector).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
5. Id. at sec. 941(b), § 15G.
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(Risk Retention Report) was issued on October 19, 2010.6 In
addition to asset-backed commercial paper, the Risk Retention
Report focused on "eight loan categories" including collateralized
loan obligations (CLOs).' Although the Risk Retention Report
contains a detailed analysis of existing "risk retention and
incentive alignment practices" for these various loan categories,
the FRB notes that because the implementing regulations are not
yet final, it is impossible to fully analyze the effect of Dodd-
Frank's risk retention requirements at this time." Additionally,
Section 946 of Dodd-Frank requires the Chairman of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to conduct a study of the
macroeconomic effects of Dodd-Frank's risk retention
requirements.9  The FSOC Chairman's report on the
Macroeconomic Effects of Risk Retention Requirements was
delivered to Congress on January 18, 2011.10 As a general matter,
the report notes that the primary potential benefit of a mandatory
risk retention framework is to improve underwriting standards."
Balanced against that perceived benefit, however, is the warning
that overly restrictive risk retention requirements "could constrain
the formation of credit, which could adversely impact economic
6. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SyS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON RISK RETENTION 1 (2010), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.pdf
[hereinafter RISK RETENTION REPORT].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321). The Financial
Stability Oversight Counsel (FSOC) is created pursuant to Section 111 of Dodd-
Frank. Id. The FSOC is chaired by the Treasury Secretary and is composed of the
following additional nine voting members: Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board,
Comptroller of the Currency, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman of
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, Chairman of the National Credit
Union Administration, Director of Federal Housing Agency, Director of the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection and an independent Presidential appointee
(subject to Senate-confirmation) with insurance expertise. Id.
10. See FINANCIAL SERVICES OVERSIGHT COUNSEL, FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT




ntion%20Study%20%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. [hereinafter FSOC CHAIRMAN'S
REPORT].
11. See id. at 3-4.
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growth."12  Unfortunately, because Section 946 of Dodd-Frank
requires the FSOC Chairman's Report to place an emphasis "on
potential beneficial effects [of the risk retention requirements]
with respect to stabilizing the real estate market," the report
contains scant reference to the effect of the risk-retention
requirements on CLOs or syndicated loans. " In fact, one of the
few references to syndicated loans implies that the goal of the risk
retention requirement is to cause the asset-backed securitization
market to manage the risk of information asymmetryl4 in the way
such risk is currently managed in the existing syndicated loan
market."
This article identifies and analyzes the potential unintended
impact that the risk retention requirements of Title IX of Dodd-
Frank could have on the syndicated loan market." Part II of this
article provides a general overview of the syndicated lending
market, identifies the basic structure of a typical CLO, and
discusses the importance of CLOs to the syndicated loan market.17
Part III analyzes the potential impact of the risk retention
requirements of Dodd-Frank on the syndicated loan market and
concludes that the risk retention requirements of Dodd-Frank will
negatively impact the syndicated loan market by disrupting the
secondary loan trading market and restricting the formation of
new CLOs.1 Next, Part IV evaluates the performance of CLOs
and syndicated loans during the credit crisis.'9 Finally, Part V
proposes an alternative to the risk retention requirements of
Dodd-Frank for improving risk management in the syndicated
loan market.20
12. See id. at 4.
13. See Dodd-Frank Act § 946(a).
14. The disparity in information between the packager-seller of a securitized
asset and the buyer of such securitized asset is referred to as "information
asymmetry." See Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Information
Asymmetry in Financial Products (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2009), available
at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-rongge/derivative.pdf.
15. See FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 17.
16. See infra pp. 25-33.
17. See infra Part II.
18 See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
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II. COLLATERALIZED LOAN OBLIGATIONS AND THE SYNDICATED
LOAN MARKET
Since the mid-1990s, the syndicated loan market and the
CLO market have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship. The
syndicated loan market provided a steady stream of new assets to
CLOs in exchange for the necessary liquidity to make new loans to
21corporate borrowers.
A. The Syndicated Loan Market
Syndicated loans are large commercial loans provided to
corporate borrowers by a group, or syndicate, of lenders.22
Although the federal government classifies any loan or loan
commitment of at least $20 million shared by three or more
supervised financial institutions as a "syndicated loan,"23 it is not
unusual for a syndicated loan to involve twenty or more separate
lenders loaning hundreds of millions of dollars to a borrower or
group of borrowers. Multi-billion dollar syndicated loans may
have hundreds of lenders in the syndicate, or bank group. One
unfamiliar with syndicated loans may conclude that a loan
transaction of the size and scope of a typical syndicated loan is
unwieldy and complex. However, quite the opposite is true.
The structure of a syndicated loan transaction facilitates
financial dealings by and among the borrower, its bank group, and
the broader capital markets.24 Syndicated loans are usually
21. See Press Release, Deerfield Capital Corp., Have CLO structures performed
as designed? (May 5, 2010), available at
http://www.deerfieldcapital.com/announcementssa/05/10/2010.-have-clo-structures-
performed-as-designed [hereinafter Deerfield].
22. See William Chew et al., A Guide to the Loan Market, Standard & Poor's
(Sept. 2010), https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketguide.pdf [hereinafter
S&P Guide].
23. See generally The Shared National Credit Program, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/snc/snc.htm (last visited Jan. 12,
2011). "The Shared National Credit Program [("Shared National Credit Review")]
was established in 1977 by the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to review and
classify large syndicated loans." Id.
24. See S&P Guide, supra note 22.
2011] 17
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
structured and arranged by one of the lenders in the bank group
called the arranger. The structuring and arranging service
provided by the arranger frees corporate borrowers from the time-
consuming and costly task of identifying multiple lenders willing to
finance the corporate borrower's operations and then negotiating
separate loan agreements with each lender. The arranger often
holds a larger percentage of the syndicated loan than any of the
other individual lenders and frequently acts as the administrative
agent for the bank group. The administrative agent facilitates the
operation of a syndicated loan transaction by acting as the primary
administrative point of contact for both the borrower and the
lenders with respect to the syndicated credit agreement. The
administrative agent also assists trading of loan commitments in
the secondary market by administering assignments of loans and
loan commitments among lenders who are party to the syndicated
loan transaction as well as between current lenders and new
lenders seeking to join an existing bank group.
Thus, syndicated loans effectively allow a borrower to
obtain larger loans than it could typically obtain from a single
lender, but without requiring the borrower to sacrifice the ease of
dealing with a single point of contact (in the case of a syndicated
loan, the administrative agent), rather than a number of individual
lenders through separate loan agreements. Lenders benefit from
syndicated lending by spreading loan commitments and obligations
among multiple syndicated loans to different borrowers which
allows lenders to better manage default risks by diversifying their
loan portfolios. Because of these advantages, syndicated loans are
the preferred way for corporate borrowers to obtain loans from
banks and institutional lenders. Domestic syndicated loans
currently provide $2.5 trillion of credit to domestic companies.25
Figure 1 below shows the dynamic growth of the overall
syndicated loan market since 1991.
25. See generally Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., Credit Quality of the Shared
National Credit Portfolio Improved in 2010 (Sept. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20100928a.htm.
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Figure 1
Annual Syndicated Loan Volume by Loan Type"
B. Basic Structure of a Collateralized Loan Obligation
A CLO is a special purpose vehicle formed for the purpose
of purchasing and holding bank loans, including syndicated loans,
as assets.27 CLOs finance the purchase of loans by issuing debt and
equity to investors seeking to obtain an interest in the cash flow
generated by the borrowers' payments of the loans held in the
CLO's diversified portfolio. The manager of the CLO typically
retains a portion of the CLO's equity, with the amount of such
26. Thompson Reuters LPC, Annual Syndicated Loan Volume by Loan Type
(2010) (unpublished) (on file with author). Investment grade loans are loans made to
corporate borrowers with a rating of at least Baa3 from Moody's and BBB- from
each of Standard & Poor's and Fitch. Leveraged loans refer to loans made to
unrated corporate borrowers or corporate borrowers with a rating lower than
investment grade.
27. See BABSON CAPITAL MGMT, LLC., THE BABSON CAPITAL WHITE PAPER 6-7
(2009), available at
http://www.babsoncapital.com/BabsonCapital/http/bcstaticfiles/Research/file/CLO%
20 White%20Paper CLOWP4309JunO9.pdf [hereinafter BABSON WHITE PAPER];
Deerfield, supra note 21, at 2. For an additional discussion of CLO structures see
RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-23.
i Leveraged ($Bils.) O Investment Grade ($Bils.) DOther($Bils.)
1800 - ------- ---- - ----- ------------------- -
1600
1400







NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
equity retention depending on the size of the CLO. Most CLOs
have a term of between twelve and fifteen years.8 The first five to
seven years of the CLO's term is called the reinvestment period
and the proceeds of early loan payments can be reinvested by the
CLO's asset manager in other syndicated loans.29 Thereafter, the
CLO enters an amortization period and eventually liquidates as
the loan assets reach maturity and are repaid.30 CLOs are a subset
of the broader class of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and,
like structured assets, the formation of new CLOs came to a
virtual standstill in 2009 as a result of the credit crisis that
precipitated the Great Recession. Although the market for new
CLO issuance has begun to recover, CLO structures are still
evolving in response to the credit crisis. CLO market participants
expect that new CLOs will be held by different types of investors
and will have simpler structures with both shorter reinvestment
periods and lower leverage when compared to CLOs pre-dating
the credit crisis.32 Because it is premature to state conclusively
what form the CLO market will take over the next few quarters,
this overview of the basic structure of CLOs is based on CLO
structures that existed prior to 2007.
The debt issued by a CLO to finance its purchase of loan
assets is allocated into separate classes or "tranches" with different
priority claims on the cash flow generated by the underlying loans
held by the CLO. The issuance of different tranches of debt allows
CLO investors to purchase the type of debt that matches the
investor's risk appetite. Investors seeking less risky investments
purchase the senior tranches of debt which are more highly rated
than the subordinated, or mezzanine, tranches. Investors willing
to tolerate increased risk in exchange for a higher return are
attracted to the mezzanine tranches of CLO debt. In this regard,
28. RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 22.
29. See id.; Kenneth Kohler, Collateralized Loan Obligations: A Powerful New
Portfolio Management Tool for Banks, SECURITIZATION.NET (Jan. 1, 1998), available
at http://www.securitization.net/knowledge/transactions/coll_1oan-obl.asp
[hereinafter Kohler].
30. Kohler, supra note 29.
31. See infra Figure 3.
32. See BABSON WHITE PAPER, supra note 27, at 6-7; Deerfield, supra note 21, at
2.
20 [Vol. 15
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the structure of a CLO closely resembles the structure of other
types of CDOs.
However, there are many important differences between
CLOs and CDOs. The most important of these differences is that
most CLOs are actively managed by well-known and experienced
third party asset managers (CLO Managers) like Babson Capital
Management LLC, Eaton Vance Investment Managers, PIMCO,
and INVESCO Ltd. Many CDOs, particularly the mortgaged
backed securities widely criticized in the aftermath of the credit
crisis are not managed at all after the original asset pool is created.
Another critical difference relates to the manner in which CLOs
are formed. Although banks that originate the loans purchased by
CLOs often assist in structuring CLOs, these banks are acting as
agents for CLO Managers rather than on their own behalf as
either sponsors or originators of the CLO. The agent bank (in this
agent capacity, the Structuring Bank) purchases loans selected by
the CLO Manager. Unlike other more passive CDO structures,
CLOs include objective financial tests to monitor the overall credit
quality of the CLO's loan portfolio.3 Finally, the underlying loans
purchased by CLOs are much more transparent assets than the
types of assets that backed the complex CDOs, now known as
"toxic assets." 35  For example, many of the syndicated loans
purchased by CLOs are issued by large public corporations, which
are required to comply with the reporting requirements of the
33. For an overview of the types of credit factors typically considered by a CLO
Manager in evaluating a potential loan purchase see BABSON WHITE PAPER, supra
note 27.
34. Typical financial tests are the interest coverage test and
overcollateralization. See BABSON WHITE PAPER, supra note 27. For a more detailed
discussion of each test and how they act as self-correcting mechanisms for a CLO's
loan portfolio see id.
35. A toxic asset is "[a]n asset that becomes illiquid when its secondary market
disappears. Toxic assets cannot be sold, as they are often guaranteed to lose money.
The term 'toxic asset' was coined in the financial crisis of 2008/09, in regards to
mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations and credit default swaps,
all of which could not be sold after they exposed their holders to massive losses."
Toxic Asset, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms /t/toxic-assets.asp
(last visited Feb. 2, 2011); see also, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE
UNITED STATES xvi, xxiii (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.fcic.gov/report
[hereinafter FCIC REPORT].
2011] 21
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Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Further, according to the
Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), the large
corporate loans typically purchased by CLOs "are publicly rated
by Standard & Poor's, Moody's or Fitch; they are liquid and trade
in the secondary loan market; and they are valued daily by third
party pricing services."06
C. The Importance of Collateralized Loan Obligations to the
Syndicated Loan Market
The growth of the syndicated loan market financed the
expansion of corporate America and the vitality of the national
economy from the early 1990s and throughout the 2000s.
Moreover, unlike other financing alternatives such as equity
issuances or asset-backed securitizations, the syndicated loan
market continued to function and provide liquidity, albeit at a
greatly reduced rate, throughout the Great Recession. In fact,
syndicated loan market volume has already recovered to pre-2003
levels, showing that the syndicated loan market is on the vanguard
of the economic recovery.
Much of the growth in the syndicated loan market is due to
the fact that the structure of syndicated loans allows for a vibrant
and liquid secondary trading market in those loans. This
secondary trading market permits non-bank institutional investors
such as CLOs to participate in the syndicated loan market on a
large scale. As demonstrated by Figure 2 below, since the mid-
1990s, the most important non-bank institutional investors in the
syndicated loan market are CLOs.
36. LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING ASSOCIATION, THE IMPACT OF RISK
RETENTION ON CLOS AND OTHER MEANS OF ALIGNING INCENTIVES 1-2 (2010),
available at http://www.Ista.org/WorkArealshowcontent.aspx?id=11904 (last visited
Feb. 12, 2011) [hereinafter LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY].
37. See, e.g., id.
38. See supra Figure 1.
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Figure 2










Quite simply, just as the growth of the syndicated loan
market drove the economic growth since the early 1990s, the
investment by CLOs in non-investment grade loans drove the
growth of the syndicated loan market. Prior to the onset of the
collapse of the credit markets in mid-2007, CLOs held over sixty
percent of all outstanding term loan debt in the domestic loan
market." Since that time, CLO market share has dropped to
below forty percent.4 ' Because new CLO issuance was virtually
non-existent during 2008 and 2009, CLO market share has been
maintained at this level through reinvestment by existing CLOs.42
Outstanding CLOs cannot support the non-investment grade
segment of the syndicated loan market indefinitely. Unless new
CLO formation continues to rebound, the LSTA predicts a $100
39. Thompson Reuters LPC, Percentage of Syndicated Loan Market Held by
CLOs (2010) (unpublished) (on file with author).
40. Meredith Coffey et al., LSTA 15th Annual Conference, Meet the New
Investors 2 (Oct. 13, 2010),
http://www.1sta.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=11568.
41. Id.
42. See infra Figure 3.
2011] 23
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
billion shortfall by 2013 between the demand for liquidity to
refinance maturing loans and the reinvestment capacity of the
current universe of CLOs.43
Figure 3












Despite the absence of CLOs from the loan market for the
past two and one-half years, the domestic loan market topped
$1 trillion in 2010, almost doubling the 2009 total of $547 billion.45
The nascent recovery of new CLO issuance in 2010 played an
important role in this recovery and most loan market participants
do not think that the loan market can continue to grow at a robust
pace in 2011 in the absence of significant new liquidity from
institutional investors including new CLO funds.46 Without the
43. Coffey, supra note 40, at 2.
44. Thompson Reuters LPC, Annual Domestic CLO Issuance (2010)
(unpublished) (on file with author).
45. Press Release, Thomas Reuters LPC, U.S. 4Q10 Loan Market Review:
Running to stand still? Banks battle run-offs, broaden mandates, re-enter leveraged
lending (Dec. 31, 2010),
http://www.loanpricing.com/pressdetail.php?yearValue=2010&press release_infoid
=8. [hereinafter Reuters Press Release].
46. Id.
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liquidity from CLOs, "capital-constrained arrangers are required
to retain a large loan portion, they are able to syndicate fewer
loans and the supply of syndicated credit is reduced." 47  The
companies most likely to be scalped by this reduction in credit
supply will be companies attempting to access the syndicated loan
market for the first time. This is because the loan market is less
familiar with such new borrowers, and as a result, arrangers have a
more difficult time selling such loans even when the secondary
loan market is not constrained by a lack of liquidity.4
Unfortunately, borrowers accessing the syndicated loan market for
the first time tend to be growing companies that are most likely to
create new jobs. If financing is not available to finance these
growing companies they will be forced to curtail or cancel their
expansion plans. Therefore, regulations that adversely affect the
CLO market will impair the ability of the syndicated loan market
to meet the credit demands of corporate America which could, in
the words of the FSOC Chairman, "adversely impact economic
growth."49
III. POTENTIAL UNINTENDED IMPACT OF THE RISK RETENTION
REQUIREMENTS OF TITLE IX OF DODD-FRANK ON THE
SYNDICATED LOAN MARKET
Because many capital markets products share
characteristics and structures, it is almost inevitable that laws and
regulations targeted at one product or structure will have
unintended effects on other unrelated capital markets products.
The only way to avoid these unintended effects is to carefully
refine the broad scope of omnibus legislation like Dodd-Frank
through well-crafted regulations implementing such laws. The
FRB specifically acknowledged this fact, noting in the Risk
Retention Report:
47. Ralph De Haas & Neeltje van Horen, The crisis as a wake-up call,
VOXEU.ORG (Aug. 25, 2010) http://www.voxeu.orglindex.php?q=node/5435
[hereinafter Haas & van Horen].
48. See id.
49. See FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
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In light of the heterogeneity of asset classes and
securitization structures, practices and performance,
the Board recommends that rulemakers consider
crafting credit risk retention requirements that are
tailored to each major class of securitized assets.
This approach is consistent with the flexibility
provided in the statute and would recognize
differences in market practices and conventions,
which in many instances exist for sound reasons
related to the inherent nature of the type of asset
being securitized. Asset-class specific requirements
could also more directly address differences in the
fundamental incentive problems characteristic of
securitizations of each asset type, some of which
became evident only during the crisis.
Syndicated loans and CLOs should be excluded from the
risk retention requirements of Title IX of Dodd-Frank. The
justification for this recommendation begins with an examination
of the statutory language.
A. Applicable Definitions
Section 941, Regulation of Credit Risk Retention, of Dodd-
Frank comprises several amendments to the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 which create the framework and minimum
standards of the risk retention requirements to asset-backed
securities." According to Section 941(a), the term "asset-backed
security" is defined as
a fixed-income or other security collateralized by
any type of self-liquidating financial asset (including
a loan, a lease, a mortgage, or a secured or
unsecured receivable) that allows the holder of the
50. RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 83.
51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891-96 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
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security to receive payments that depend primarily
on cash flow from the asset, including (i) a
collateralized mortgage obligation; (ii) a
collateralized debt obligation; (iii) a collateralized
bond obligation; (iv) a collateralized debt obligation
of asset-backed securities; (v) a collateralized debt
obligation of collateralized debt obligations; and (vi)
a security that the Commission, by rule, determines
to be an asset-backed security for purposes of this
*12section.
CLOs fall squarely within the definition of "asset-backed
security" under Dodd-Frank because, as discussed in Part II
above, CLOs are a type of collateralized debt obligation which are
collateralized by a loan." This conclusion is supported by the
inclusion of CLOs as one of the eight loan categories analyzed by
the FRB in the Risk Retention Report.54
Under Dodd-Frank, Section 941(b) defines the term
"securitizer" as "(A) an issuer of an asset-backed security; or (B) a
person who organizes and initiates an asset-backed securities
transaction by selling or transferring assets, either directly or
indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuer."" Based on
this definition, a CLO, the CLO Manager, and the CLO's
Structuring Bank could all be classified as "securitizers." As
noted by the LSTA, because the Structuring Bank is simply
working as an agent for the CLO Manager, "it is unfair to require
structuring banks to hold on to risk in a portfolio they are simply
sourcing at the direction of another party." 7
Finally, the term "originator" means a person who (i)
through the extension of credit or otherwise, creates a financial
52. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
53. See infra Part II.
54. See RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
55. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(3) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
56. See id.
57. LOAN SYNDICATION AND TRADING AsSOCIATION, LSTA WHITE PAPER 4
(2010), available at http://www.1sta.org/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=10976
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter LSTA WHITE PAPER].
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asset that collateralizes an asset-backed security; and (ii) sells an
asset directly or indirectly to a securitizer.5 ' As discussed in Part II
above, many syndicated loans are structured and arranged by a
lead bank which acts as an arranger on behalf of the borrower.5 9
Large leveraged syndicated loans, especially those used to finance
leveraged buy-outs, frequently have several co-lead arrangers that
collectively structure and arrange the loan. In either case,
arrangers syndicate their loans by selling a portion of their loan
commitment to an initial bank group prior to the closing. On the
closing date of the loan, the arrangers and the original bank group
each own a portion of the syndicated loan. Loans typically begin
trading in the secondary market as soon as they are closed.o If a
portion of the loan is purchased by a CLO, which is likely, that
loan has been sold to a "securitizer" and becomes "a financial
asset that collateralizes an asset-backed security." 61 Therefore, the
arrangers and any other lender party to a syndicated loan on the
closing date could be deemed to be "originators" under Dodd-
Frank's expansive definition of that term.62
B. The Risk Retention Requirements
Pursuant to new Section 15G (Credit Risk Retention) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 added by the Dodd-
Frank Act, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively, "Federal
banking agencies") together with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the SEC) are required to "jointly prescribe
regulations to require any securitizer to retain an economic
interest in a portion of the credit risk for any asset that the
securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security,
58. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
59. See infra Part II.
60. Loan commitments are often traded prior to the closing date of the loan as
well.
61. See LSTA WHITE PAPER, supra note 57, at 5.
62. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
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transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party" within 270 days
following the effective date of Section 941(b).63 According to the
FRB website, during the period of January 2011 through March
2011, the FRB will develop jointly with the other Federal banking
agencies and the SEC a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to
implement the credit risk retention requirements of Dodd-Frank.6
Under the applicable standards of Dodd-Frank, such regulations
shall "require a securitizer to retain . .. not less than 5 percent of
the credit risk for any asset" other than certain qualified
residential mortgages.6 ' Finally, pursuant to Section 941(b), the
risk retention regulations shall "provide for . . . the allocation of
risk retention obligations between a securitizer and an originator
in the case of a securitizer that purchases assets from an originator,
as the Federal banking agencies and the Commission jointly
determine appropriate."" Although Dodd-Frank does not
prescribe the specific form of risk retention that is required under
Section 941, the FSOC Chairman's Report notes that "the general
forms include: a vertical slice (a pro rata piece of every tranche), a
horizontal slice (a first loss interest in the securitization structure),
or an equivalent exposure of the securitized pool (retaining a
random selection of assets from the pool)."67
The five percent minimum may be reduced for any asset so
long as the originator of such asset complies with the applicable
"underwriting standards established by the Federal banking
agencies that specify the terms, conditions, and characteristics of a
loan within the asset class that indicate a low credit risk with
respect to the loan" pursuant to Section 15G(c)(2)(B).6
63. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(b)(1) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
64. See Initiatives Planned: January to March 2011, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_milestones201101.htm (Feb. 11,
2011). This Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was not released as of the date of
publication of this article.
65. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(B)(i) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-11).
66. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(G)(iv) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-11).
67. See FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT supra note 10, at 19.
68. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(c)(1)(B)(ii) & (c)(2)(B) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 780-11).
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Moreover, pursuant to Section 15G(e) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934, "[t]he Federal banking agencies and the
Commission may jointly adopt or issue .. . exemptions, exceptions,
or adjustments for classes of institutions or assets relating to the
risk retention requirement . . . under subsection (c)(1)" of Section
15G.69  According to the FSOC Chairman's Report, "[s]uch
exemptions, in combination with risk retention requirements, may
further incent strong underwriting practices."'o
C The Potential Unintended Negative Effect of the Risk Retention
Provisions on CLOs
The risk retention requirements of Dodd-Frank will
negatively impact the syndicated loan market by disrupting the
secondary loan trading market and restricting the formation of
new CLOs.
1. The Effect on The Secondary Loan Market Caused By Treating
Lenders As "Originators""
The LSTA uses the following example to illustrate the
problem of treating the arranger and original lenders as
"originators" for purposes of Dodd-Frank. Assume that Bank A
receives a larger allocation of a syndicated loan at closing than it
can hold long term in accordance with its internal risk
management policies. To reduce its exposure, Bank A sells a
portion of its loan to Bank B. Thereafter, Bank B sells a portion
of the loan it purchased from Bank A to a CLO. As a result of
Bank B's sale to the CLO, Bank A has indirectly sold that asset to
a securitizer (the CLO that purchased a portion of the loan from
69. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(e) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 780-11).
70. See FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 25 ("Exemptions could
take into account a borrower's history of debt repayment, the borrower's current and
anticipated capacity to make debt payments, and the quality and value of the
collateral securing repayment.").
71. For ease of reference, under Dodd-Frank, the term "originator" means a
person who (i) through the extension of credit or otherwise, creates a financial asset
that collateralizes an asset-backed security; and (ii) sells an asset directly or indirectly
to a securitizer. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 941(b), § 15G(a)(4) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-11).
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Bank B). Moreover, once the loan becomes part of the CLOs
portfolio, Bank A has effectively created a "financial asset"
through the extension of credit (the original loan) that is collateral
for an asset-backed security (the CLO's debt). The end result is
that upon the sale to the CLO by Bank B of a portion of the loan
that Bank A originally sold to Bank B, Bank A has become an
"originator" within the meaning of Dodd-Frank.7 2 This result
holds true even if the transaction between Bank B and the CLO
occurs several years after the Bank A sale to Bank B. If Bank A
no longer held five percent of its original loan at the time that it
became an originator as a result of the sale from Bank B to the
CLO, Bank A would have to purchase loans in the secondary
market to achieve compliance with Dodd-Frank. Forcing Bank A
to enter into a trade purely for regulatory compliance purposes
long after the original syndicated loan had closed and its terms had
been finalized does not mitigate any risk whatsoever. Moreover,
to be able to monitor compliance with Dodd-Frank, Bank A would
need to track all subsequent sales and assignments of the loan it
sold to Bank B until the date that the underlying loan had been
paid off in full. 73 It is even possible that Bank A would need to
continue to track the loan beyond that date if the underlying loan
was repaid with the proceeds of an amended and restated loan
agreement to which Bank A was a party. This sort of tracing is not
feasible and according to the LSTA such "capability does not exist
in the secondary loan market."74 The likely result of such an
onerous requirement would be that banks would prohibit sales of
loans to CLOs thereby eliminating the tracing problem as well as
all of the market liquidity provided by CLOs."
2. The Effect on New CLO Formation Caused by Classifying
Structuring Banks and CLO Managers as "Securitizers"
The effect of classifying Structuring Banks and CLO
managers as "securitizers" would have a similar chilling effect on
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overall market liquidity. Structuring Banks are not currently
compensated to hold a portion of the assets they are purchasing at
the direction of a CLO Manager and it is not economically feasible
for CLO Managers to compensate Structuring Banks for that
risk. As a result, banks would be unwilling to act as Structuring
Banks and that would significantly increase the difficulty of
forming new CLOs.
To evaluate the potential impact of the Dodd-Frank's risk
retention requirements on the CLO market, the LSTA recently
completed a study of existing CLO funds holding $99 billion in
assets under management (AUM).n The results of this survey
show that if Dodd-Frank's risk retention requirements are
applicable to CLOs there will likely be a drastic impact on new
CLO formation. First, eighty-seven percent of the CLO Managers
surveyed indicated they could not retain a five percent vertical
slice78 of their CLOs to satisfy Dodd-Frank's risk retention
requirements, with a majority of CLO Managers surveyed stating
that they lacked the necessary capital to retain a five percent
vertical slice.79  Although only thirteen percent of survey
respondents indicated that they could retain some risk in the form
of a horizontal slice," a majority of respondents indicated that they
lacked sufficient capital to hold a five percent horizontal slice.
Survey participants were also asked to predict whether or not they
could successfully form new CLOs based on risk retention
requirements ranging from one percent to five percent. As
illustrated by Figure 4 below, a five percent risk retention
requirement that takes the form of a required equity contribution
has the potential to reduced new CLO formation by up to eighty
percent. The loss of that much potential liquidity in the form of
new CLO funds will have a devastating effect on a syndicated loan
market facing a potential $100 billion refinancing shortfall in the
next two years.
76. Id.
77. See generally LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 1-2.
78. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for a description of a vertical slice.
79. See generally LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 3.
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text for a description of a vertical slice.
81. LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 3.
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Figure 4
Percent of Survey Respondents That Could Raise New CLO Funds
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IV. PERFORMANCE OF CLOS AND SYNDICATED LOANS DURING
THE ULTIMATE STRESS TEST
Concern that the risk retention requirements proposed by
Dodd-Frank will severely limit the formation of new CLO funds
and thereby reduce the amount of credit available to finance an
economic recovery is not, in and of itself, a reason for the
syndicated loan market to reject the risk retention requirements.
After all, if the risk retention requirements achieve the stated goal
of promoting financial stability and ending bailouts, then perhaps
the adverse "side effects" of Dodd-Frank's strong medicine are
tolerable. To answer this question, we need to determine how the
CLO market and the syndicated loan market responded to the
credit crisis of the past three years - the ultimate bank "stress
test."
82. LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 5.
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The Risk Retention Report evaluated the performance
during the credit crisis of each of the asset classes, including CLOs,
subject to the report. With respect to CLOs, the Risk Retention
Report focused on the period from December 2008 to December
2009 and observed that although sixty-five percent of CLO
tranches rated Aaa were downgraded during this period, three-
quarters of those downgraded tranches retained an investment
grade rating of Aa." Moreover, the FRB noted that "estimates
suggest that 15 percent of outstanding CLO deals have had at least
one tranche upgraded since mid-2009 despite the toughening of
rating standards. Mezzanine tranches have reportedly accounted
for most of the recent upgrades."4 With respect to syndicated
loans, the FRB recognized that "[diespite fairly widespread
downgrades, there were only a few actual defaults. Defaults in the
underlying collateral - syndicated corporate loans - were limited,
with CLO collateral defaults peaking at 6.5 percent in June
2009."" According to the FRB, "[t]he relative transparency of the
asset pool and the relative simplicity of the structures may also
have played a role, in addition to the credit enhancements and
incentive alignment mechanisms discussed earlier [in the Risk
Retention Report]." Finally, the FRB concluded that "[b]reaches
of overcollateralization triggers peaked in June 2009, with 57
percent of CLOs failing minimum OC [overcollaterlization] tests.
Since then, most deals have cured and only 10 percent are still in
breach of minimum OC levels as of September 2010."87
Participants in the capital markets concurred with the FRB,
concluding that during the credit crisis "CLOs performed the way
they were designed to perform"88 and noting that despite "the
magnitude of the financial crisis, CLOs have performed
remarkably well" during the Great Recession.8 These conclusions
are supported by an econometric" analysis of the syndicated loan
83. RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 62.
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id. at 62.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 63.
88. See Deerfield, supra note 21.
89. See LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 5.
90. Econometrics is defined as "the application of statistical methods to the study
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market in the aftermath of the credit crisis as well. More
specifically, a study accepted by VoxEU.org, a policy portal set up
by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, found that "the
outbreak of the crisis led to a significant and robust increase in
arrangers' retention rates."91 "This increase materialised during
the early phase of the crisis - before the collapse of Lehman
Brothers and the ensuing sharp output decline - and persisted over
time."92 Finally, managers of CLOs that were adversely impacted
by the credit crisis saw their management fees partially or fully
blocked in accordance with the terms of their management
agreements. 93 This blockage of fees ensured that the managers of
downgraded CLOs suffered immediate and negative economic
consequences at the same time as the investors in the CLOs
managed by such managers.
In short, the syndicated loan market weathered the
financial "perfect storm" better than the broader securitization
market.9 4 Lest advocates of the syndicated loan market become
too self-congratulatory, they should note that outperforming the
securitization market over the past few years is a low bar to clear.
The credit crisis laid bare many shortcomings in the syndicated
loan market which I will address in greater detail in Part V.95
Nevertheless, the comparatively successful reaction and response
of both the CLO market and the syndicated loan market to the
credit crisis are clearly relevant to evaluating the appropriateness
of risk retention requirements for the syndicated loan market. For
example, in evaluating the response of the syndicated loan market
to the credit crisis, the Haas and van Doren econometric analysis
documented
a strong, broad-based but market-driven increase in
retention rates among syndicate arrangers.
of economic data and problems." Econometrics Definition, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/econometric (Last
visited Jan. 20, 2011).
91. Haas & van Horen, supra note 47.
92. See id.
93. See LSTA CLO RISK RETENTION SURVEY, supra note 36, at 5.
94. See Haas & van Horen, supra note 47.
95. See infra Part IV.
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Participant lenders, concerned about arrangers' lax
screening and monitoring, were in many cases able
to take corrective action without regulatory
intervention. Although syndicated lending declined
sharply, the market did not break down. This
stands in contrast to the securitization market,
where the link between the originator and the
ultimate investors was too severed to make any
corrective (and collective) action possible.96
Although Haas and van Doren acknowledge that "this
market-driven self-regulation may not last forever," they suggest
that a market-based response, whereby loan participants such as
CLOs require originators of syndicated loans to maintain a
meaningful position in their loans is superior to a regulatory
response. 7 Echoing this conclusion, the Risk Retention Report
observes that "the arranging bank's ownership of part of the loan
could be considered originator's risk retention" with respect to a
syndicated loan purchased by CLOs.98 In addition to the self-
regulation observed by Haas and van Doren, the syndicated loan
market self-corrected the lax underwriting standards that prevailed
in the period preceding the credit crisis by significantly tightening
underwriting standards in the aftermath of the crisis.99 According
to the most recent Annual Survey of Credit Underwriting
Practices prepared by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, this tightening of underwriting standards continued into
early 2010.'0
96. See Haas & van Horen, supra note 47 (emphasis added).
97. See id.
98. RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 47.
99. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY'S 15TH ANNUAL SURVEY OF
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V. A MODEST PROPOSAL
Although the syndicated loan market survived the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression, it is obvious that
syndicated loan investment bankers took far too many unjustified
and excessive risks in the pursuit of short-term gains prior to the
onset of the credit crisis. In the words of Ken Lewis, former Chief
Executive Officer of Bank of America and himself a casualty of
the credit crisis, "[w]e are close to a time when we will look back
and say we did some stupid things."' 1 Robert Kindler of Morgan
Stanley put an even finer point on things when he stated, "[w]hen
you net out all the profit versus all the losses, Wall Street hasn't
made money, it's lost money."l 02 Notably, Lehman Brothers and
Wachovia were both ten months away from failing and the
economic crisis had at least several more years to run at the time
Kindler made that statement. In fact, the value of large-cap
domestic banks, as measured by the Dow Jones U.S. Banks Index,
fell almost sixty percent from June 1, 2007 to December 27, 2010.03
During the first quarter of 2009, the index declined over eighty
percent.'0 Obviously, the decline in banks' market capitalization
and the devastation of their balance sheets was not attributable
solely to problems in the syndicated loan market. Nevertheless,
uncontrolled risk-taking in the syndicated loan market certainly
contributed to the overall problem. When one considers that loans
are the most basic business of a bank, the fact that syndicated
loans caused so much trouble is particularly shocking.
101. Francesco Guerrera, On Wall Street Something's Gotta Give waiting for the
last reel to unwind, FIN. TIMES (May 11, 2007, 5:16 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/lfeb4af2-ffda-lldb-8c98-
000b5dfl0621.html#axzzlALOGNrxf.
102. Dennis K. Berman, The Private Equity Boom: A Net Loser for Wall Street?,
WSJ BLOGS: DEAL JOURNAL (Oct. 16, 2007, 8:30 AM) (on file with author); see also
Les Leopold, Why Do People Who Work in Finance Earn So Much More Than the
Rest of Us?, ALTERNET (Jan. 11, 2011),
http://www.alternet.org/story/149634/whydo-people-who-workin-financeearn-so
much_morethantherestof us/ (estimating that "[f]or every dollar 'earned' on
Wall Street" during the past five years "about 8 dollars were destroyed" as a result of
the economic crisis).
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It is doubtful that the risk retention requirements of Dodd-
Frank would have mitigated risks in the syndicated loan market
had they been in force prior to 2007. First, as Haas and van Doren
have shown, the syndicated loan market responded on its own with
de facto originator risk retention requirements at the outset of the
credit crisis.'05 Unfortunately, the market response was insufficient
to staunch the crisis. For example, one of the most problematic
deals of the credit crisis was the financing of the $24 billion
leveraged buy-out of Clear Channel Communications Inc. by
Thomas H. Lee Partners and Bain Capital.106 The syndication of
the financing for the Clear Channel leveraged buy-out was a
complete failure and the loan's originators ended up holding one
hundred percent of the loan.107 This transaction, like many others
during 2007-2008, was the subject of protracted and acrimonious
litigation which finally settled in early May 2008.'0
The losses from deals like Clear Channel were not caused
by the failure of the borrower to repay the loan. Rather, it was the
punishment meted out by the secondary loan trading market that
did the damage. Historically, syndicated loans have been a stable
asset class trading at or near par in the secondary market.' 09 The
credit crisis changed all that. Prices for loans in the secondary
market collapsed with leveraged loans being hardest hit, and the
secondary market for leveraged loans with deal terms structured
before the crash in mid-2007 that dropped between forty percent
and sixty percent below par during 2008."10
A simple example illustrates the devastating effect of this
pricing collapse on a multi-billion dollar leveraged buy-out
105. See Haas & van Horen, supra note 47.
106. See Clear Channel: Lessons Learned, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 14, 2008,
11:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/clear-channel-lessons-learned/
(hereinafter Clear Channel). The Clear Channel leveraged buy-out came to be
known as one of the "Four Buy-outs of the Apocalypse", along with the proposed
leveraged buy-outs of BCE, Huntsman and Penn National Gaming. See The Four
Buyouts of the Apocalypse, N.Y. TIMEs DEALBOOK (Apr. 8, 2008, 10:28 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/the-four-horsemen-of-the-apocalypse/.
107. See Clear Channel, supra note 106.
108. See id.
109. Meredith Coffey et al., State of the U.S. loan market 6 (Jan. 7, 2009),
http://www.pcbe.org/pcbe.nsf/0/032c37afb934a03a85257537005962f2/$file/COFFEY
PCBE_200901_07.pdf [hereinafter 2009 State of the Loan Market Presentation].
110. Id.
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structured and underwritten in 2007 before the crash, but closed in
2008 after the crash. Assume that a group of arrangers are unable
to syndicate a $4 billion syndicated loan backing a large leveraged
buy-out and the value to the arrangers of that syndicated loan
financing drops sixty percent - or $2.4 billion - on the day the
syndicated loan closes. Even if the arrangers earned a sizeable
underwriting fee of two percent, or $80 million, on the loan, they
still suffer a loss of $2.32 billion. Regardless of whether the loan is
sold in the secondary market (thus monetizing the loss) or held in
the hopes of a rebound in the price, the mark-to-market rules in
effect in 2008 caused the arranger to book a significant loss.
If the risk retention requirements of Dodd-Frank are not
the right medicine for excessive risk in the syndicated loan market,
what is? Answering this question is particularly timely as the
syndicated loan market has once again topped $1 trillion. A recent
survey of syndicated loan participants by Thomson Reuters
identified "maintaining discipline in underwriting" as one of the
"biggest concerns heading into 2011."111
To answer this question, it is necessary to revisit how the
syndicated loan market became so risky in the first place. The
biggest single factor driving risk in the syndicated loan market was
record liquidity. William E. Conway, Jr., founding partner,
managing director, and chairman of the investment committee of
The Carlyle Group summed up the issue in his 2007 annual review
memorandum when he stated, "[f]rankly, there is so much liquidity
in the world financial system, that lenders (even 'our' lenders) are
making very risky credit decisions."" 2 According to Mr. Conway,
this accommodating credit market allowed The Carlyle Group to
generate "fabulous profits.""' A properly functioning credit
market depends on robust competition between borrowers and
lenders for the best deal terms. When this competition is missing,
a credit market ceases to function properly. You do not need an
111. Reuters Press Release, supra note 45.
112. Memorandum from William E. Conway, Jr. to All Investment Professionals,
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advanced economics degree to recognize that a credit market that
enables borrowers' financial sponsors to make "fabulous profits"
at the expense of lenders who are doing "stupid things" is broken.
At the height of the credit boom, assertive financial
sponsors played their role and aggressively pushed for the best
deal terms for the borrowers they controlled. Until the bubble
finally burst, there was so much excess liquidity in the credit
markets that financial sponsors could afford to make every point a
"deal breaker" because they were virtually assured that some
other lender somewhere would "hit the bid" and take the offered
terms.14 Lenders effectively abdicated their role in a properly
functioning market for the least common denominator. If a
financial sponsor could secure a concession from any syndicated
loan arranger in any deal, that concession was immediately foisted
on all lenders as a "market term" regardless of the context of the
original deal in which such term was negotiated. This market
imbalance allowed risk to flood into the syndicated loan market.
As the boom continued, financial sponsors were able "to do
transactions that were previously unimaginable.""' Effectively,
lenders ended up accepting, without much objection, whatever
terms the financial sponsors requested. In the final years of the
credit boom, all pretense of a negotiated deal was abandoned as
the lawyers representing financial sponsors drafted the loan
documents and presented them to the lenders and their counsel for
execution. Despite efforts by lender's counsel to dissuade their
clients from acquiescing to the worst of the sponsor's demands -
such as covenant lite structures, broad equity cure rights, payment-
in-kind and token amortization payments until maturityll-
114. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 175.
115. Conway Memorandum, supra note 112.
116. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 35, at 175. The term "covenant lite" refers to
loan agreements with incurrence covenants rather than maintenance covenants.
Incurrence covenants are only tested when a borrower takes an action that is limited
by the covenant. If the borrower can demonstrate compliance with the covenant
both before and after giving pro forma effect to the proposed action, then the action
is permitted and the covenant is not tested again unless the borrower engages in
another action in the future that is subject to the covenant. Maintenance covenants
are tested on a regular basis, most often at the end of each fiscal quarter of the
borrower. Maintenance covenants are considered to be more restrictive than
incurrence tests because a maintenance covenant can be breached as a result of a
deterioration of the borrower's financial performance. Conversely, as long as a
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anything but the most superficial negotiation of the financial
sponsor's documents was strongly discouraged. As the Clear
Channel transaction discussed above illustrates, risk retention
requirements do nothing to solve this problem. Those
requirements are based on the idea that the "securitizer" is selling
assets that it would never buy itself to a market that lacks the
securitizer's knowledge about the quality of the underlying asset
backing the security.117 In the syndicated loan market, the
arrangers are active market participants that will have to live with
borrower is able to avoid taking any action subject to an incurrence covenant, the
borrower never has to demonstrate compliance with the covenant even if the
borrower's financial performance has declined. See S&P Guide, supra note 22, at 17-
18. An equity cure right permits, but does not require, the borrower's shareholders
to cure breaches of financial maintenance covenants by investing additional equity in
the borrower. The funds that are invested are typically treated as additional
EBITDA earned in the quarter immediately preceding the cured breach for purposes
of calculating financial covenant compliance. Because financial covenants are
typically tested quarterly, the borrower will not have to demonstrate financial
covenant compliance until another three months have passed. Although the lenders
may benefit indirectly in the short term from the equity cure funds invested in the
borrower, the equity cure may have significant negative effects in the long term if the
borrower's financial performance is declining rapidly. See S&P Guide, supra note 22,
at 24-25. Payment-in-kind rights allow a borrower to make regularly scheduled
interest payments in the form of additional debt on the same terms as the existing
debt. For example, a paid-in-kind option would permit a borrower to pay a $700
interest payment on a $10,000 promissory note by issuing another promissory note on
the same terms in the amount of $700. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT
GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS (7th ed. 2006). At the
height of the bull market preceding the credit crisis, it was not uncommon for loan
agreements to limit quarterly amortization payments to 0.25 percent of the
outstanding principal of the loan until the final year of the loan. This exposes the
lenders to a greater risk of non-payment than if the loan agreement required larger
amortization payments earlier in the term of the loan. S&P Guide, supra note 22, at
16.
117. The disparity in information between the packager-seller of a securitized
asset and the buyer of such securitized asset is referred to as "information
asymmetry." See Sanjeev Arora et al., Computational Complexity and Information
Asymmetry in Financial Products (Princeton Univ., Working Paper, 2009), available
at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/-rongge/derivative.pdf. At least one study has
concluded that complex derivatives like CDOs and CDSs actually amplify the cost of
information asymmetry rather than mitigate it. Id. According to this study, "[tihe
practical downside of using derivatives is that they are complex assets that are
difficult to price." Id. Further, the study concludes that even minor information
asymmetry in complex derivatives may make such derivatives "computationally
intractable to price derivatives." Id. Stated more simply, "derivative contracts could
contain information that is in plain view yet cannot be understood with any
foreseeable amount of computational effort." Id. If this paper's conclusions are
correct, there is no way to quantify the risks associated with complex financial
derivatives let alone manage or mitigate the risk.
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the very deal terms that will become a problem in the future. The
fact that arrangers held significant portions of the loans that had
the worst terms in the prior market did nothing to improve the
credit quality of those loans.
The solution to this problem is to allow lenders' lawyers to
do the job they were hired to do, namely assist their clients in
making informed, deliberate, and rational underwriting decisions
and then negotiating loan documents that reflect those
underwriting decisions. Deal terms should never be justified
simply because they are "market terms.""' At best, such
justifications are lazy underwriting; at worst, they permit
indefensible credit structures simply because "everybody else is
doing it." During the credit boom that preceded the credit crisis,
lending transactions included whatever terms the most
experienced borrower's counsel could wring from the most junior
associate representing the lead arranger. This is not an attempt to
pass the buck or blame the least experienced lawyers for the
prevalence of risky deal terms in syndicated loans. Certainly,
experienced senior attorneys bear the responsibility for closely
supervising less experienced attorneys on every deal. But not even
the best lawyer and most experienced negotiator can win a battle
his or her client is unwilling to fight. History has shown that when
lenders hold their ground in negotiations they can permanently
change the market. For example, although financial sponsors
uniformly dislike market flex"9 provisions in loan commitments,
those terms have remained a standard part of the syndicated loan
market since the late 1990s. This is because lenders simply refuse
to budge on this point. It is true that the scope and effectiveness of
118. The deal terms of any specific deal are a product of the negotiations of the
parties to that loan agreement and therefore are unique to that deal. Although the
LSTA promulgates model credit agreement provisions for syndicated credit
agreements, these provisions are primarily intended to facilitate the administration
relationships among the members of the bank group and trading in the secondary
loan market. The LSTA does not have any involvement in negotiating or drafting
the substantive deal terms, such as pricing, repayment and covenants of any
transaction.
119. Market-flex provisions allow syndicated loan arrangers to adjust, or "flex"
pricing of the syndicated loan in response to investor demand for the syndicated loan.
See S&P Guide, supra note 22. Often, pricing can only be adjusted within a set range.
Market-flex provisions also typically allow for loan amounts to be re-allocated among
the various loan tranches composing the overall syndicated loan. Id.
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market flex terms move with the market, becoming more limited
when liquidity is high and less so when underwriting standards
tighten; but it is also true that market flex is here to stay.
Some deals must be turned down. If no deal is too
aggressive, then there is no risk management. Though a bank only
makes money if it earns fees on closed deals, not every deal is
worth the fee paid. The cost of losing a deal, or even several deals,
is ultimately far less than the risk of over-committing to a bad loan
in a bad loan market. An indisputable lesson from the credit crisis
is that the downside risk of a large underwritten commitment for a
supersize leveraged buy-out can far exceed any fees that were
earned or could have been earned.
So how can banks ensure that outside counsel engaged to
protect the interests of the institution and its shareholders are not
ignored by the investment bankers responsible for negotiating and
closing syndicated loan transactions? First, in-house counsel must
expressly be given the responsibility for protecting the institution
from excessive underwriting risk. Investment bankers should not
be allowed to have the final say on underwriting risk
determinations, because their compensation is tied to the short-
term fees generated by closing deals regardless of how those deals
perform over time. This simple fact makes investment bankers too
self-interested to be expected to exercise detached judgment in
determining which deals cross the line between acceptable risk and
excessive risk. To ensure that outside counsel are not forced to
choose between the Scylla of acquiescing to a deal that is simply
too risky and the Charybdis of being replaced with a more
accommodating lawyer, the in-house legal department must have
the sole authority to engage, and if necessary, replace outside
counsel. Outside counsel and in-house counsel can then be held
accountable for how effectively they protect the institution and its
shareholders from excessive risk.
Not surprisingly, bank chief executive officers may resist
such a solution because many bank executives are former
investment bankers who probably view lawyers as more of an
impediment to deal-making rather than protectors of the
institution's balance sheet. Dodd-Frank provides the response to
this objection. To justify an exemption for syndicated loans from
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the risk retention requirements of Dodd-Frank, syndicated loans
must comply with "underwriting standards established by the
Federal banking agencies., 12 0  Therefore, the Federal banking
agencies have the authority under Section 941(b) of Dodd-Frank
to require the risk management and underwriting responsibilities
outlined above. 121 Although investment bankers accustomed to
having the final say on underwriting decisions may find this
approach difficult to accept, the reality is that Dodd-Frank
requires improved risk management. Banks can either rely on
their own lawyers to strengthen underwriting procedures to
improve risk management, or the government will step in and
attempt to do the job through a mandatory risk retention
framework under Dodd-Frank. Because self-regulation is almost
always less onerous than direct government regulation, the
preferable choice for banks is obvious.
VII. CONCLUSION
Because of the complexity of Dodd-Frank and the vast
array of implementing regulations yet to come, it is nearly
impossible to predict the consequences - intended and unintended
- of the new law at this time. Nevertheless, it is important to
identify obvious problems and shortcomings while there is still
time to affect the final form of the implementing regulations.
Dodd-Frank's risk retention requirements were drafted in
response to the view that asset-backed securities, especially
subprime residential mortgage backed securities, were the prime
122culprit in the credit melt-down. The risk retention requirements
are intended to cause financial institutions that package and sell
asset-backed securities to better manage risks relating to such
securities by requiring those institutions to keep "some skin in the
game" rather than selling the entire issuance to third parties.23 In
120. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 941(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1891-96 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
11).
121. Id.
122. FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 10-14; see also FCIC
REPORT, supra note 35, at xxiii-xxiv, 101; WEIL OVERVIEW, supra note 3, at 17.
123. See FSOC CHAIRMAN'S REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 15-17; WEIL OVERVIEW,
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trying to achieve this goal, however, regulators must be mindful of
the FRB's admonition that "simple credit risk retention rules,
applied uniformly across assets of all types, are unlikely to achieve
the stated objective of" Dodd-Frank.124 CLOs are very different
from the types of asset-backed securities that motivated the risk
retention requirements. These differences enabled the syndicated
loan market to bend but not break during the Great Recession,
whereas the securitization market simply collapsed due to its
inability to take any corrective action in response to the credit
crisis. Forcing CLOs to comply with arbitrary risk retention
requirements will have a chilling effect on the formation of new
CLOs at a time when the liquidity that could be provided by CLOs
is critical to the recovery of the credit markets. Without the
liquidity provided by a robust CLO market, banks will simply not
be able to provide all of the credit needed to fund and sustain a
vigorous economic recovery. Rather than attempting to tackle the
shortcomings of the syndicated loan market with strategies
conceived for a different problem, lenders should empower their
lawyers to police risk and prevent deal terms and structures that
cannot be rationally justified on business grounds. After all, a
lawyer's most basic responsibility is to protect his or her client's
interests.
supra note 3, at 17.
124. RISK RETENTION REPORT, supra note 6, at 3.
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